Security in the PASTA project by Stabell-Kulø, Tage
Security in the PASTA project
Tage StabellKul









This report presents the system model for the security eort in the Pasta
project We present the objectives of the security eort the threats we
will consider and those we will not consider As such the report describes
the environment which applications must be prepared to face and still
provide users with the desired degree of privacy
  Introduction
The Pasta project is concerned with the introduction of personal portable
machines in a distributed system The project studies a wide range of issues
that arises from this point of view
In Pasta we plan to investigate how users can ensure that access to data
entrusted to the File Repository called FR see below is granted in accordance
with the owners policy This report describes the overall guidelines for this
endevaur
We start out by presenting our objectives The threats we consider some we
explicitly do not take into account and the assumptions we make are presented
in Section  In Section  we give a short presentation of our research vehicle
the FR We sum up in Section 	
 Objectives
In Pasta we assume widespread usage of personal machines This must be
re
ected in the way security is investigated An ever increasing part of the
machines in modern systems is under the full control of their owners and ocial
policies for securityor on any other issue for that mattercan thus only be
applied to a shrinking part of the overall resources In particular as computing
becomes personal the corporate model one central agency that can enforce a

security policy of computing becomes outdated It is a goal of this project
to understand how this development will eect issues related to security And
since computing in our view is a personal activity privacy will predominately
have our attention In particular we will investigate whether it is possible to
build a distributed system that enables each and every user to have and enforce
his own security policy Each user must make his own decisions regarding
security and privacy There will denitely not be a single systemwide security
policy at any level
Based on this line of argument we have established the following as the
objectives of the security eort
  It must be possible to formulate a trust relation and to verify that a
particular relation holds
Trust and trust relations is one of the fundamental building blocks of
any system that provides security In order to give each user the ability to
maintain and enforce his own security policy the system must provide the
means for each user to distinguish those subjects he do trust from those
that he do not trust
  Any user must in isolation be able decide upon whom to place trust
It follows from the above that there can be no trusted third party in
this system at least not one that everybody must trust On the other
hand any set of users must be able to establish a server they trust to
do or not to do something The infrastructure must make it possible
to fully exploit such a trust resource Naturally not placing trust in
providers of important services may lead to denial of service but that is
an dierent issue altogether
  It must be possible to delegate to someone a principal some authority
over some object
Communication between any two users may be direct in which case they
themselves decides on the policy they want to enforce If they choose
to communication through FR the servers involved should enforce the
policy the users specify
  The system should be structured so that other types of secrets than shared
or public encryption keys may be used to identify a channel as originating
from a particular user or server
  Every part of the system must be structured so that it is possible to
understand the eect of the compromise of any secret
In other words only those who have chosen to place trust in something a
secret for example are hurt if the secrecy is compromised It is thus an
objective to minimize the threat to security that is caused if the secrets
of a principal are compromised
In general we believe that decisions related to security should be visible and
that trust relations should be explicit

 Threats and Assumptions
Throughout our investigation the following is asserted to be true
  The condentiality of any datum kept within a users machine is only so
good as the ability of that particular user to protect it
In general users have their own personal machines This implies that
the user is fully in control of the machine and also that they are fully
responsible for the maintenance of the security features of the machine
There is a clear distinction between the users intentions and their actual
ability
  In general one can not trust a machine with the possible exception of
ones one
In particular it might be dicult to trust a certicate which for example
states machine X says user U is logged on without any further proof of
this claim
  Any datum sent across a computer network can be seen altered withheld
andor replayed by some malicious third party
  One can not trust the networks notion of the origin of any datum
On the other hand we also make two simplications
  Communication is either possible connected or not at all possible dis
connected
This does not imply that messages are assumed to arrive in its entirety
since communication links may break
  We assume encryption is perfect
Perfect encryption holds both for sharedkey encryption systems such as
IDEA and DES and publickey encryption systems such as RSA This
includes the impossibility of generating a message that matches a given
checksum provided by algorithms such as MD	
Only the holder of the correct key can obtain any information about the
contents of an encrypted message Naturally we do not assume that
only legitim users have access to keys machines can be compromised for
example Perfect encryption can be viewed as a black box approach
We will however be careful to avoid interference between dierent cryp
tographic tools
Discarding the assumption on perfect encryption might be natural extension of
the project at a later stage

 File Repository
When users utilize more than one machine they experience a consistency prob
lem If some of these machines are portable and therefore often disconnected
this can be a nuisance Within Pasta we are concerned with building an
infrastructure to ease these problems
FR provides services to users through a set of servers These cooperate and
maintain a distributed repository in which users can store les Research into
the area of replication protocols and policy is part of the project at large and
will not concern us here We assume that any datum can be replicated if need
be with the limitations that arises from an unsecure and possibly malicious
environment
Clients eg users machines interact with servers by means of some stan
dard Internet communication protocol In practice this protocol will be the
TCPIP protocol suite but we do not believe this choice has any security im
plications
About the scale of the system we assume the following
  A relatively small set of sites will together support a FR connected
through a widearea network In the order of ten sites will participate
  In general we envision that each site will run a small set of servers we
assume in the order of three servers per site
  Associated with each set of servers there will be a number of users There
will be in the order of one hundred users per site
  Every user will own more than one machine One of them will presumably
be a high performance workstation and one will probably be a small
mobile palmtopsized computer
We make these numbers explicit but security must not be violated even if any
of them are grossly under or over estimated However we allow performance
to depend on them
 Conclusions
In this report we have outlined the functional requirements of a security model
for FR The main point is that we aim not for a fully secure system but one
in which each user may decide in isolation which risks he is prepared to take
Work on the dierent subareas of the project at large should adhere to these
requirements
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